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Abstract. This paper proposes, characterizes and
outlines the beneﬁts of a new computer level
speciﬁcally for multi-agent problem solvers. This
level is called the cooperation knowledge level and
involves describing and developing richer and more
explicit models of common social phenomena. We
then focus on one particular form of social interaction
in which groups of agents decide they wish to work
together, in a collaborative manner, to tackle a
common problem. A domain independent model
(called joint responsibility) is developed to describe
how participants should behave during such problem
solving. Particular emphasis is placed on the problem
of ensuring coherent behaviour in the face of
unpredictable and dynamic environments. The utility
of this model is highlighted in the real-world
environment of electricity transportation
management. In this domain, agents have to make
decisions using partial, imprecise views of the system
and the inherent dynamics of the problem mean that
team members have to continually evaluate the
ongoing problem solving process. Joint responsibility
provides the evaluation criteria and the causal link to
behaviour upon which individual and social situation
assessment is based
1. INTRODUCTION
Sophisticated problem solving is based upon
knowledge. In advanced problem solving
systems (typiﬁed by expert systems), this
knowledge can be divided into two distinct
categories: knowledge about the problem domain
and knowledge about problem solving per se.
First generation expert systems had many
important drawbacks including brittleness, weak
explanation and unclear boundaries during
knowledge acquisition - characteristics attributed
to their sole use of surface knowledge (Steels,
1984). To overcome these problems, second-
generation systems use rich and explicit models
of knowledge (deep knowledge (Steels, 1984)),
explicit inference structures (eg (Clancy, 1985)
within the ﬁeld of heuristic classiﬁcation),
problem solving methods (McDermott, 1988)
and generic tasks and task-speciﬁc architectures
(Chandrasekaran, 1983). The success of such
knowledge-level (Newell, 1982) approaches in
single agent problem-solving systems, has yet to
be transferred into Distributed AI (DAI) in which
multiple agents work together to solve common
problems. In multi-agent systems, a cooperation
knowledge level would be concerned with those
aspects of problem solving speciﬁcally related to
interacting with other agents - offering rich and
explicit models of various social phenomena
(cooperation, conﬂicts, competition, etc.) and the
reasoning processes which control them. In
Newell’s taxonomy of computer system levels,
the cooperation level would be directly above the
knowledge level. The cooperation knowledge
level differs from the individual knowledge level
in that it has groups of agents as the system rather
than individuals. That is, descriptions at this
level must be in terms of collectives, not just the
individual components. Like the others, the
cooperation level can be reduced to the level
directly below it - ultimately being expressed in
terms of single agents and individual goals,
actions and knowledge states (knowledge level
components).
Some recent trends in contemporary DAI can be
viewed as moving towards cooperation
knowledge level solutions; though there is still
greater need for the recognition and deﬁnition of
this new level. The most widespread use of deep
models of social phenomena occur within the
context of communication; in speech act theory
communication primitives and their affects are
explicitly represented and are reasoned about by
the sender in order to try and bring about speciﬁc
mental states in the hearer (Searle, 1969). Other
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illustrations of deeper reasoning models occur in
conﬂict resolution (Lander et al., 1990; Klein &
Baskin, 1990) in which resolution strategies are
categorized and selected according to the desired
objective and prevailing circumstances; in
persuasion/negotiation (Castelfranchi, 1990;
Sycara, 1989) in which agents reason about how
to induce greater cooperativeness in other
community members and in the deﬁnition of
hedonic states, likes, goals and values based on
physical dynamics (Kiss & Reichgelt, 1991).
The beneﬁts of cooperation knowledge level
systems include: enhanced explanation facilities,
greater generality (and hence software
reusability) and easier knowledge acquisition for
the multi-agent system designer. Explanation can
be enhanced because group activities can be
described at a meta-level rather than at a task or
message level (eg A1 and A2 have a conﬂict
about Y). The advances in explanation facilities
offered by such systems are especially important
in environments in which the user plays an active
problem solving role (such as industrial control
(Jennings, 1991a)). Software reusability is
enhanced by separating out the domain
independent principles from the domain-
dependent knowledge which they make use of.
The generic component embodying the
cooperation knowledge level can then be applied
to new problems merely by substituting in the
appropriate domain knowledge. Finally, the
multi-agent system developer is aided by having
a focused set of questions, strategies and options
with which to confront the organization which
commissioned the system.
Here we concentrate on one particular form of
social interaction, namely the solving of a
common problem by a team of agents - eg
several agents lifting a heavy object, musicians
in an orchestra, driving in a convoy and playing
cricket. A complete cooperation knowledge level
description would need to cover the following
aspects: the detection of when team problem
solving is required/beneﬁcial, what organization
form the team will take (will there be a single
controller, a controlling committee or will all
members be equal?, will decisions require
unanimous or majority support?), who should be
in the team (is it best to have small teams with
each member doing signiﬁcant amounts of
processing or larger teams with less active
members?), how to recruit community members
to the team (will individuals join merely out of
benevolence or will they need convincing?, if so
how), how to construct the team plan (single
planner or multiple partial planners?), how to
divide the labour within the team, how to behave
once team activity has begun and how team
activity should be terminated. Fortunately, not all
of these issues need to be addressed every time;
in many situations, these issues will be
constrained by the structures (organizational,
common reference model etc.) already present in
the environment.
Team problem solving is a sophisticated form of
collaboration (cf requesting a piece of data);
interactions may be protracted, involve several
exchanges of information and opinions or require
agents to modify their stances on certain issues to
accommodate the desires of others. During such
activity there is significant scope for errors,
misunderstandings and changing opinions,
especially if the application domain is itself
complex and subject to change. Section two
describes a typical industrial control scenario in
which agents have to operate in such
circumstances. In this environment agents have
to take decisions based on partial, imprecise
views of the system which they may wish to alter
at a later stage as more information becomes
available. To cope with this inherent
unpredictability, incompleteness and
environmental dynamicity, it is important that
the collaborators have a well specified
description of how to evaluate their ongoing
problem solving and a prescription of how to
behave should the joint activity run into
difficulties.
Groups of agents are the cooperation knowledge
level system, therefore it is necessary to be able
to describe the activities of groups, rather than
just those of individuals. One potential group-
level description is that of joint intentions - a
commitment to perform collective action while
in a certain shared mental state (Cohen &
Levesque, 1991). Here we propose the notion of
joint responsibility which defines shared
commitment for team problem solving (Jennings,AAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
 Heterogeneous Intelligent Agents
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1991b). Responsibility differs from other
accounts of joint intentionality in that it stresses
the role of a “conduct controller” (Bratman,
1990) - specifying how agents should behave
whilst engaged in collaborative problem solving.
Previous work in this area (Rao & Georgeff,
1991; Lochbaum et al., 1990; Searle, 1990) has
concentrated on deﬁning what it means for a
joint intention to exist; this description being in
terms of nested structures of belief and mutual
belief about the goals and intentions of the
individual and of other agents within the
community. However these descriptions are of
limited value in dynamic and unpredictable
environments because they fail to describe what
conditions may jeopardize collaborative activity
and the concomitant prescription of how the
agents should behave in such circumstances.
Responsibility also incorporates and extends the
work of Cohen and Levesque (1991); defining
joint commitment for both plan and goal states.
2. MONITORING ELECTRICITY
TRANSPORT NETWORKS
To be available at customers’ sites, electricity
has to be transported, sometimes over many
hundreds of kilometres, from the power station
where it is produced. During this process, there is
significant scope for problems (eg power lines
may become broken, substations damaged by
lightning strikes, etc.). To ensure early detection
of such problems, many distribution companies
have installed sophisticated monitoring and
diagnosis software. An example of three such
systems, acting cooperatively to produce a list of
faults, is shown below:
AAA
BAI CSI
Figure 1: Cooperating Agents in transport management
Black out
area (BOA)
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Network model
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out of service
The CSI (Control System Interface) is
responsible for receiving messages from the
network and analyzing them to determine
whether they represent a fault. The AAA (Alarm
Analysis Agent) has to pinpoint the elements at
fault and the BAI (Blackout Area Identifier)
indicates the group of elements out of service
(the blackout area - BOA), both of which are
based on the CSI’s information. Several
cooperative scenarios can be identified between
this group of agents (Aarnts et al., 1991),
however we will concentrate on the one depicted
above.
The CSI continuously receives information about
the state of the network, which it groups together
and analyses. In most cases, this information will
periodically be sent to the BAI and AAA so that
they can update their network models. However
when the information encodes a fault, the CSI
immediately informs the other two. Whereupon
the AAA starts its diagnostic process for
identifying the specific network elements at fault
- initially producing a quick, approximate answer
which it subsequently refines using a more
accurate procedure. At the same time, the BAI
starts determining the BOA, which when
calculated is passed onto the AAA.
In order to be consistent, the elements identified
by the AAA should also be in the BOA produced
by the BAI - a fact taken into account by the
AAA during its detailed diagnosis. While the
AAA and BAI are working on the diagnosis, the
CSI continues to monitor the network in order to
detect significant changes in status or indicate
whether the fault was only transient. Therefore
once a fault has been detected, each agent has a
role to play and by combining their expertise,
problem solving is enhanced. The degree of
system robustness can be improved by sharing
information which is available within the system,
but not readily available to all the agents. There
are two main cases in which this can be seen:
firstly, if the CSI detects that a fault is transient
and the other two are working on diagnosing a
nonexistent fault. Secondly if further faults
occur, the network topology may be so radically
altered that the existing diagnosis is predicated
on invalid assumptions. Further details of the
implementation of this scenario are given inAAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
 Heterogeneous Intelligent Agents
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(Jennings et al., 1992).
3. THE RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORK
Joint responsibility deﬁnes the conditions which
need to be satisﬁed before joint action can be
initiated and speciﬁes a code of conduct for
agents once problem solving has commenced. It
uses ﬁrst order logic (^ AND, v OR, ~NOT) and
the model operators BEL, GOAL and MB.
BEL(x, p) and GOAL(x, p) mean agent x has p
as a belief and a goal respectively, MB({x, y}, p)
that x and y mutually believe p1. The standard
temporal operators from dynamic logic: T
(always) and ◊ (eventually) are also used. As in
(Cohen & Levesque, 1990), we use p?;a to mean
“action a with p holding initially” and a;p? to
mean “action a with p holding as a
consequence”.
3.1 Common and Joint Persistence of Goals
Before joint action can commence a group of two
or more agents must realise they have a common
objective (or intention2) that they wish to fulﬁll
by collaborating with others. This recognition
may occur through necessity (eg one agent
cannot lift a heavy object alone) or through belief
that a team approach is best (eg when searching
for a lost object in a large area it is often better to
do so as a team). Once a common objective has
been agreed by all team members, a joint goal
can be said to exist and individuals become
committed to achieving it.
However individual commitment is not a
sufﬁciently sturdy foundation upon which robust
joint action can be based (Cohen & Levesque,
1991). To rectify these problems the notion of
joint persistent goals (JPGs) is proposed, in
which groups of agents become jointly
committed to a common aim. There are two
facets to JPGs: the conditions under which
1. Mutual belief is taken to be the infinite conjunction
of beliefs about the other agents’ beliefs, about the
other agents’ beliefs (and so on to an infinite depth)
about a proposition. Note MB({x}, p) ≡ BEL(x,p)
2. Intentions have been ascribed a variety of different
meanings (eg (Bratman, 1990; Werner, 1989)); within
this context they specify a desire or target without
consideration of how it is to be attained.
commitment to a joint goal can be dropped and a
prescription of how an individual should behave
in such circumstances. Commitment to a joint
goal can only be dropped if one team member
believes that: the goal has been achieved, the
motivation for it is no longer present or it will
never be attained. When any of these conditions
are fulﬁlled, the team member who is no longer
committed cannot simply disregard the
remaining group members and start new work;
rather it must endeavour to inform others of his
lack of commitment. The rationale for this being
that if one of the team members is no longer
committed to the group objective, then there
must be a good cause for this (since it was once
committed) and hence other team members
ought to be made aware so they do not waste
effort unnecessarily.
3.2 Solution Commitment
JPGs are not sufﬁcient for obtaining joint action.
They only specify that agents have a common
desire to reach a target state, they do not specify
how to reach this state. There are many real
world illustrations of the necessity of agreement
of a solution before joint action can commence.
At the cooperation knowledge level we are
concerned with the underlying principles related
to this common solution requirement, not
implementation speciﬁc details. We are
concerned with the fact that participants must
agree to the principle of a common plan, of
enumerating conditions under which
commitment to the joint plan can be dropped and
deﬁning how team members should behave
towards others in such circumstances.
3.2.1 Multi-Agent Planning Syntax
In common with most modern planning systems,
the adopted representation formalism deﬁnes
points in the search space as partially elaborated
plans which are traversed using plan
transformations. Plans are represented as an
action ordering in which the actions, described
by operators, are strung together with temporal
ordering relations (Hendler et al., 1990). There
are two types of action: those which can be
undertaken by individuals (primitive actions) and
those in which groups of agents work togetherAAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
 Heterogeneous Intelligent Agents
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(social actions)3. Throughout this section, let the
set of agents in the community be represented by
A, the set of primitive actions which can be
performed by some agent in the community by P
and the set of social actions which community A
can perform by S. Note P ⊆ S since a primitive
act can trivially be performed by 2 or more
agents.
Group problem solving requires some actions to
be synchronized; there will be relationships4
between them. Relationships can involve
arbitrary numbers of actions and may be
composed entirely of primitive actions, or of
social actions or a mixture of the two. So if s1, s2
∈S; p1, p2 ∈P and ℜa,b(a,b) the relationship
between actions a and b then, the following
relationship types may exist: ℜs1,s2(s1, s2),
ℜp1,p2(p1, p2), ℜs1,p1(s1, p1) and ℜp1,s1,s2(p1, s1,
s2). Two actions are independent if ~ℜa,b(a, b).
All actions within a sequence are also subject to
at least one relationship, the tautology ℜa,a(a, a).
Relationships between actions are as important
as the actions themselves. For instance when
moving an object in which all parties are
required to lift at the same time, failing to satisfy
the relationship SIMULTANEOUSLY means
the object will not be moved.
Actions can be combined into ﬁnite sequences to
specify more complex interactions. Sequences
are composed of at least one action and may
contain mixtures of primitive/social actions and
related/independent actions. A sequence Σ
containing 4 actions (3 social [s1, s2, s3 ∈S], 1
primitive [p1 ∈P]); two of which are related (s2
and s3) and two of which are not (p1, s1) can be
written as follows: Σ ={p1, s1, ℜs2,s3(s2, s3)}.
For our purposes, it is assumed that primitive
actions are solved by action sequences of length
one (i.e. action p ∈P is solved by the sequence Σ
={p}5). In goal directed systems, actions are
carried out in order to attain particular
objectives; so Σσ means that action sequence Σ is
3. Social actions ultimately give rise to primitive
actions as it is the individuals who have the ability to
act.
4. Relationships may be temporal (Allen, 1984), plan
transformations (Hendler et al., 1990) or express other
types of constraint.
executed in order to fulﬁll objective σ.
It is often useful to distinguish the actions which
need to be performed from the agents who will
actually perform them. This separation allows
the mechanisms for deciding which actions need
to be performed (determining the recipe (Pollack,
1990)) to be independent of task and resource
allocation mechanisms. Once the action
sequence has been deﬁned, the agents who will
actually execute them need to be decided upon;
actions and action sequences must be
instantiated:
Primitive Action Instantiation:
<α, a>: agent α∈ Α  is involved in primitive
action a ∈P
Social Action Instantiation
<{α1,..,αn}, σ>: agents α1,..,αn ⊆ A (n > 1) are
involved in social action σ∈ S
Action Sequence Instantiation
A sequence of primitive and social action
instantiations. It speciﬁes the agents who will
perform each individual component as well as
the actions which need to be performed. If Σσ is
an action sequence, then its instantiation is
represented by Σ’σ
Other predicates associated with actions (a ∈P, σ
∈S) include: EXECUTE(α, a) and
EXECUTED(α, a) meaning that agent α will
execute action a next and has just executed a
respectively. MOTIVE(<{α1,..,αn}, σ >) gives
the reason why agents α1,..,αn wish to achieve σ.
This will typically represent a goal-subgoal
hierarchy with the root node giving the reasoning
for carrying out the joint action. So in the
transportation domain, the motivation for
collaborative activity is that a fault has been
detected and the motivation for carrying out
speciﬁc actions (eg monitoring the network) is
that they are a part of the joint act of diagnosing
the fault. RELATION-OK indicates that the
relationship between two actions σi, σj ∈ Σ’σ is
5. In reality primitive actions may be composed of
several sub-actions, but because these are internal to
the agent they need not be specified at this level.AAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
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satisﬁed. If the two actions are unrelated then this
predicate returns true:
RELATION-OK(<{αw..αx}, σi>, <{αy...αz}, σj>, Σ’σ) ≡
?ℜσi,σj v (~∃ℜ σi,σj ∈Σ ’σ)
3.2.2 Performing Actions
The simplest type of action whose execution can
be described is a primitive act. For an agent (α
∈A) to execute primitive action (a ∈ P) within
the context of action sequence Σ’σ; all
relationships involving a in Σ’σ must be satisﬁed:
PERFORM(<α, a>, Σ’σ) ≡
(∀ <{αw...αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ)
RELATION-OK(<α, a>, <{αw...αx}, σi>, Σ’σ)?;
EXECUTE(α, a)
Similarly before a group of agents ({α1,..,αn} ⊆
A, n ≥ 2) can execute a social action (σi ∈S)
within the context of action sequence Σ’σ; any
relationships in Σ’σ involving σi must be
satisﬁed:
PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σi >, Σ’σ) ≡
(∀ <{αw... αx}, σj> ∈Σ ’σ)
RELATION-OK(<{α1,..αn}, σ i>, <{αw..αx},  σj>,
Σ’σ)?;
(∃Σ’σi PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σi >, Σ’σi))
where Σ’σi is a solution developed by {α1,..,αn}
for solving σi. The predicate PERFORMED
indicates whether a joint action has been carried
out and uses EXECUTED instead of EXECUTE.
3.2.3 Deﬁning Solution Commitment
Having given the syntax and semantics of the
plan description language we proceed with the
deﬁnition of solution commitment. The ﬁrst
aspect is that all team members acknowledge the
principle that a common solution (action
sequence) is needed if the objective is to be
achieved:
NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
(◊ ∃Σ’σ PERFORM(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)) v T~σ
A prescription of how team members should
behave once such a solution has been developed
is also required for a comprehensive model. To
develop robust, collaborative problem solving
systems for dynamic environments it is
important that agents are able to continually
evaluate their ongoing activities. To provide a
well founded basis for this evaluation,
circumstances in which commitment to an
agreed solution can be dropped need to be
enumerated:
• the motivation for carrying out one of the
actions is not present.
LACKING-MOTIVE(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}
(∃<{αw..αx}, σi> ∈ Σ’σ) ~MOTIVE(<{αw..αx}, σi>)?
• following the agreed action sequence does not
achieve the desired action.
INVALID (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
PERFORMED(<{α1,..,αn}, σ >, Σ’σ); ~σ?
• one of the speciﬁed actions cannot be carried
out.
UNATTAINABLE (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
{αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}
(∃ <{αw,..,αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ)
T∼PERFORM(<{αw,..,αx}, σi> Σ’σ)
• one of the agreed actions has not been carried
out.
VIOLATED (<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
~PERFORMED(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)
The above situations are those in which an
individual team member can locally detect that
the agreed common solution is no longer
sustainable. In such circumstances the agent
needs to reassess its commitment to the agreed
solution:
LOCAL-PROBLEM(α,<{α1..αn},σ>,Σ’σ) ≡
α ∈ {α1,..,αn}
BEL(α, LACKING-MOTIVE(<{α1..αn},σ>,Σ’σ))v
BEL(α, INVALID(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)) v
BEL(α, UNATTAINABLE(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)) v
BEL(α, VIOLATED(<{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ))
Because of the very nature of group problem
solving, if one team member stops contributing
because it has detected a problem then the whole
joint action solution may be jeopardised.
Therefore if an agent comes to realise that one of
its fellow team members has dropped
commitment to the solution, then it needs to
reassess its position to take this information intoAAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
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account. In contrast with the previous reasons, this
time the problem has been detected or caused by
the actions of another team member:
NON-LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡
αi ≠ α, α ∈ {α1,..,αn}
BEL(α,( ∃αi ∈{α1,..,αn}
LOCAL-PROBLEM(αi, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)))
It is now possible to state the situations under
which agent α can drop commitment to an agreed
common solution Σ’σ for group action <{α1,..αn},
σ>:
DROP-SOLUTION-COMMIT(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)≡
α∈{ α 1,..,αn}
LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) v
NON-LOCAL-PROBLEM(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)
It is not sufﬁcient for an agent to simply disregard a
joint action once it is no longer committed to the
agreed solution. The reason for this being that just
because one team member (α) has detected a
problem it cannot be assumed that all its
accomplices have been able to so. Therefore to
ensure such information is disseminated as widely
as possible within the group, α must endeavour to
inform all other team members of the fact that it is
no longer committed and also the reason why. This
enables them to reassess the actions involving α
and the agreed solution itself - meaning that if the
common solution needs to be abandoned or
reﬁned, then the amount of wasted resource is
minimised because futile activities are stopped at
the earliest opportunity. Individual solution
commitment (ISC) represents a high level
description of how each team member should
behave in its own problem solving and towards
others with regard to the agreed solution:
ISC(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) ≡ α ∈ {α1,..,αn}
WHILE ~DROP-SOLUTION-COMMIT
(α, <{α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ) DO6
 (∀ <{α, αw,..αx}, σi> ∈Σ ’σ)
{α, αw,..,αx} ⊆ {α1,..,αn}
BEL(α, ◊PERFORM(<{α, αw,..αx}, σi>,Σ ’σi))^
◊PERFORM(<{α, αw,..αx}, σi>,Σ ’σi))
WHEN GOAL(α, MB({α1..αn},
DROP-SOLUTION-COMMIT(α,<{α1..αn},σ>,Σ’σ)))
6. WHILE p DO q WHEN r: while p is true, q will
remain true. When (if) p becomes false, q will be false
and r will become true
Therefore for each action that α is involved in, it
should believe that it is going to perform that
action and also that it will actually perform the
action at the appropriate time given the correct
circumstances. This mental state continues until
α has good cause not to follow the agreed
solution; whereupon it aims to disseminate its
lack of commitment to all the others. Combining
the results of this section, there are two facets
concerned with performing actions in a social
group: agreeing to the principle of a common
solution and deﬁning how individuals should
behave once such a solution has been chosen:
SOLUTION-COMMITMENT(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
MB({α1,..,αn},
NEED-COMMON-SOLUTION(<{α1..αn}, σ>)) ^
MB({α1,..,αn},
(∀α i ∈ {α1,..αn} ISC(αi,< { α1,..αn}, σ>, Σ’σ)))
3.3 Full Joint Responsibility
We can now deﬁne the mental state of joint
responsibility which a group of agents {α1,..,αn}
must adopt if they are to jointly solve common
problem σ:
JOINT-RESPONSIBILITY (<{α1,..,αn}, σ>) ≡
MB ({α1,..,αn}, JPG(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>)) ^
MB ({α1,..,αn}, SOLUTION-COMMITMENT
(<{α1,..,αn}, σ>))
Responsibility fulﬁls an important desiderata of
joint intentions: “agents need general policies
that govern the reconsideration of prior
intentions and plans. This non-reconsideration
should be treated as the default over-rideable by
special kinds of problems” (Bratman, 1990). It
deﬁnes the preconditions for joint problem
solving as well as prescribing how individuals
within the team should behave (both in default
and exceptional circumstances) once such
activity has started.
4. RESPONSIBILITY IN TRANSPORT
MANAGEMENT
Once a fault has been detected and the three
agents have been informed and agreed to
participate in the collaborative activity, a joint
goal exists:
σ = <{AAA, BAI, CSI}, DIAGNOSE-FAULT>AAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
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When the necessary preconditions have been
met, the actual solution can be developed. The
responsibility framework is independent of any
particular planning paradigm; so it may be
derived by one agent planning for all the others
or from a collaborative planning exercise
involving several agents. A potential action
sequence Σ’diagnose instantiation for σ is:
{PAR ( <{CSI}, MONITOR-NETWORK>,
<{BAI}, PRODUCE-BOA>,
<{AAA}, INITIAL-DIAGNOSIS>},
AFTER(<{BAI}, PRODUCE-BOA>,
<{AAA}, FINAL-DIAGNOSIS>)
AFTER (<{AAA}, INITIAL-DIAGNOSIS>,
 <{AAA}, FINAL-DIAGNOSIS>)}
Having established the common solution,
responsibility requires each agent to carry out its
agreed part whilst committed to the joint action σ
and to the solution Σ’diagnose. If everything goes
smoothly, the objective will be satisfied and the
joint goal will be terminated according to the
rules specified for joint persistent goals.
However because of the dynamics of the
environment and the uncertainty inherent in the
system, several events may disrupt this
commitment. Related to the joint goal of
diagnosing faults, the CSI may come to realise
that the group of alarms only represented a
transient fault (motivation for σ no longer
present) or the AAA may realise that it is not
being supplied with sufficient alarms with which
to make a diagnosis (σ will never be attained).
Problems may also arise with the agreed
solution: the CSI may detect a substantial change
in the network, meaning that the models being
used by the AAA and BAI are so inaccurate that
any ensuing diagnosis will be incorrect (plan
invalid) or that it is no longer receiving
information about the network and so is unable
to monitor its status (action unattainable). Also
the BAI may be distracted by an unplanned task
and be unable to produce the black out area at the
agreed time (plan violation), meaning the AAA
cannot compare its initial hypotheses with the
black out area to ensure consistency before
undertaking the detailed analysis.
As this scenario highlights, the collaborative
activity of diagnosing a fault is fraught with
opportunities for failures which may be caused
by the actions of any of the team members. Also
when the joint activity does run into problems, it
is usually detected by only one team member, the
others have to rely on being informed by this
individual as they are unable to detect it
themselves. Without a prescription of how to
behave or criteria against which to evaluate joint
problem solving activity, the team may perform
in an inefficient or uncoordinated manner. For
example, if after having detected the fault is
transient, the CSI merely stopped its local
activity without informing the others then they
would continue to expend computational
resource on diagnosing a fault which does not
exist. Responsibility ensures that the CSI is tries
to inform the BAI and the CSI that the
motivation for the joint action is no longer
present.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a domain-independent, high-
level model of the collaborative problem solving
process as a contribution towards the
development of the cooperation knowledge level.
Responsibility describes the conditions which
need to be satisﬁed before joint problem solving
can commence and prescribes how individuals
should behave once such activity has begun. It
offers an initial step towards the goal of
providing a DAI theory which accounts for how
aggregates of agents can achieve joint actions
that are robust and continuable despite
intermediate foul-ups and inconsistency (Gasser,
1991). It also provides a mechanism for
controlling activity in dynamic and unpredictable
environments, whilst still sustaining a degree of
generality and predictability.
Empirical evaluation of the performance of
agents situated in the dynamic and unpredictable
environment of electricity transport
management has been undertaken (Jennings &
Mamdani, 1992). The results obtained highlight
the importance of providing a theoretically
grounded model for tracking the execution of
joint actions and of prescribing how to behave
when things do not go according to plan.
Compared with groups of selﬁsh problem solversAAAI Workshop on Cooperation among
 Heterogeneous Intelligent Agents
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and communities in which group problem
solving emerges from agent interaction, agents
organised according to the responsibility model
perform over twice as well if there is a greater
than ten percent chance of the problem solving
running into difﬁculty.
Joint responsibility is also an important step
forward in the ﬁeld of distributed and multi-
agent planning. At present these systems do not
maintain or make use of a principled model of
joint problem solving activity and their control
knowledge is compiled-down and represented
implicitly within the planning formalism. Joint
responsibility offers an explicit meta-level
representation which is independent of any
particular planning paradigm but can easily be
mapped down to this level. Hence the causal and
motivational links, for many of the important
actions and interactions within the planners can
be explained by referring to the high level
responsibility model.
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